Olena Babakova: Ukrainians in Poland Have Become a Scapegoat

Ukrainians have become a subject of manipulation in the Polish presidential elections. This is a consequence of deteriorating Polish-Ukrainian relations, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in society, and a lack of gratitude for the aid provided to Ukrainians in 2022, which Poles now expect – believes Olena Babakova, a candidate of historical sciences, researcher of migration policy in Central and Eastern Europe, and a journalist who has lived in Warsaw for 17 years.

The second round of the election campaign will take place on Sunday, June 1. Competing for the presidential office are Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, the candidate from Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ruling “Civic Platform” party, and Karol Nawrocki, the nominee of Jarosław Kaczyński’s opposition “Law and Justice” (PiS) party.

What can Ukrainians in Poland expect after the presidential election? When can they themselves influence the agenda in this country? Is Poland interested in Ukrainian refugees? Why isn’t it integrating Ukrainians? And are Ukrainians planning to return due to worsening attitudes from Poles?

Olena Babakova answers these and other questions in the “Gris” public initiative’s project – “Bridges of Ukraine.”

Ukrainians in Poland have, for the first time, become a separate topic of the election race. How do we explain the change in narratives?

Polish politicians, like other Western ones, have become increasingly dependent on social surveys in recent years. Anti-migrant rhetoric began to be heard not only in the messages of right-wing parties in 2023, but anti-Ukrainian rhetoric was also added to it. Several factors played a role here.

Russian PSYOP (information-psychological special operation) popularized the image of Ukrainian refugees as those who prevent Poles from using social services. Stories circulating on Twitter since 2022 include: “My neighbor wanted to go to the doctor, and my aunt wanted to enroll her godson in kindergarten, but all the spots were taken by Ukrainians.” These were always anonymous “a little bird told me” stories. Nevertheless, people believe them not only in the Polish hinterland; the educated Warsaw middle class believes them too. Although studies show that Ukrainians, both labor migrants and refugees, use the Polish healthcare system less frequently than Polish citizens. However, this is perceived by society as a threat that the availability of already not-so-good social services in Poland will decrease. Polish politicians do not deny this. Karol Nawrocki, the nominee of Jarosław Kaczyński’s “Law and Justice” (PiS) party, even proposed creating a system that would automatically move Ukrainians to the end of the queue for doctors after Poles.

Secondly, according to various social surveys in Poland, we see that attitudes towards Ukrainians are constantly deteriorating. They are increasingly perceived as a burden on the Polish budget rather than people who need help in a difficult situation. More and more often, besides diligence, which is often the first association with Ukrainians, ingratitude and demandingness are mentioned. Since 2022, Polish politicians have been talking about how much they have given to Ukrainians. Although very often this aid came from EU or UN funds, and according to calculations by various institutions, Ukrainians contribute more to the Polish budget and Pension Fund than is spent on their aid. However, these figures are almost absent from public discussion. There is only a general image that “we have given a lot and received very little in return.”

During the presidential campaign, even liberal candidates said that the 800+ payments should be taken away from refugees (800+ is monthly assistance of 800 zlotys for each child in a family – ed.). According to studies, 88% of Poles support limiting these payments to Ukrainian refugees.

Today, in Polish society, the ideal Ukrainian migrant is a person who fights for Ukraine at the front, at the same time pays large contributions to the Pension Fund in Poland so that it does not collapse, and receives a small salary so as not to overly strain Polish entrepreneurs. This is like transporting a wolf, a goat, and cabbage in one boat.

Towards the end of the race, candidates shifted more to foreign policy issues of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, these issues indirectly impact the Ukrainian community, which has become a scapegoat. The attitude towards Ukrainians in Poland is a derivative, on the one hand, of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and on the other, of processes within Polish society.

How can we change this rhetoric regarding Ukrainians?

First, unfortunately, Ukrainians are not the only large diaspora that faces xenophobia from the host society. Let’s recall Brexit in Britain in 2016, where Poles, Romanians, and Bulgarians mainly “took the heat.” This was despite the fact that most of them worked there, had no problems with the law, and were well integrated into the labor market. Could the Polish, Romanian, and Bulgarian governments protect them? Unfortunately, no. There was xenophobia, which British politicians then stirred up, and cases of violence against Polish citizens. This was despite the fact that about 800,000 Poles live in Britain.

The only thing the Polish government could do was to ensure legally enshrined social and economic guarantees for its citizens in that country. The interference of foreign politicians in the information space of another country is more likely to be detrimental. This situation is not exceptional, and no solution was found for it then.

Regarding Polish-Ukrainian relations, it is very good that exhumations have begun, and it is important that they continue. It is also important that the resolution of situations like the grain crisis and other tensions occur behind closed doors, not on Twitter.

It’s good that there will be a Ukrainian hub in Poland (the Ministry of National Unity plans to open a Ukrainian hub for Ukrainians in Poland – ed.) and that the embassy is becoming more active in working with the diaspora, appearing at migrant forums, and inviting representatives of migrant organizations more often. It’s an important demonstration that the Ukrainian state stands behind you. Recently, there was a bullying campaign against Natalka Panchenko, the leader of Euromaidan-Warsaw, for a not-so-successful statement in an interview (on “Channel 5,” Panchenko said that “stirring up animosity between Ukrainians and Poles is very dangerous, especially for Poland,” as it could lead to clashes, arson of shops and houses in the country). The embassy stood up for her. This is an important symbolic moment, because before this, the embassy preferred to remain silent.

And how exactly can the Ukrainian community influence the change in narratives in the country?

In a democratic country, you change the agenda by voting for politicians who represent your agenda. But among Ukrainians, the naturalization rate is still very low (“naturalization” – granting citizenship, ed.). Accordingly, Polish politicians currently have no incentive not to use negative narratives about the Ukrainian community, because “what’s the difference?”

Last year, almost 16,000 Ukrainian citizens received Polish passports. Over 10 years, fewer than 40,000 Ukrainians, according to the Polish Ministry of Interior. When will Ukrainians become a significant electoral force so that politicians stop manipulating the Ukrainian community?

Perhaps already in the next Sejm elections in 2027. At least in Warsaw, Krakow, and Gdansk, Ukrainian votes should be enough for two or three deputies. But this still won’t stop the general discussion across the country.

The Ukrainian community is generally on the right track. On the one hand, it engages in identity preservation programs. On the other hand, it has integration programs, meaning rapprochement with Poles. But without the support of the Polish state as a partner, it will be very difficult to achieve something solely through their own efforts.

The Polish state does not invest in the Polish identity of Ukrainians. It constantly talks about integration, or assimilation, unfortunately perceiving these words as synonyms. But no matter how much it talks about it, it does nothing for it.

Poland doesn’t integrate Ukrainians

So, Poland is more interested in Ukrainians as labor migrants, rather than full-fledged citizens of its society, as it was before the full-scale invasion?

Yes, but Poland is not alone in this. The same can be said about migration to Germany, France, and other countries.

Ukrainians are well integrated into the Polish labor market. About 90% of labor migrants and 70% of refugees work, which is a record for Europe. Integration into Polish institutions, meaning using various public services and interacting with the Polish state, is worse.

Paradoxically, Ukrainians are least integrated into Polish society and culture. This is because there’s this illusory idea that if the languages are similar, Ukrainians will quickly learn Polish and start communicating with Poles. That’s not how it works. Studies show that Ukrainians have Polish acquaintances at work, but rarely have Polish friends. Similarly, Poles who have a positive attitude towards Ukrainian workers and neighbors do not have Ukrainians in their close circles.

Ukrainians often live in “bubbles.” Especially in large cities. You can go months without speaking Polish because you know shops, cinemas, nail salons, and hairdressers where Ukrainians work. And this is precisely a problem not of the Ukrainian, but of the Polish state, which further increases the antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles.

After the change of government in 2023, the Polish government should have focused more on integration, even opening a network of centers for foreigners across the country. But all this was slowed down during the presidential campaign, because first the Confederation, and then Law and Justice, began to use it against the ruling party to show that money was being spent on foreigners, not Poles. These centers were supposed to provide free Polish language courses, psychological counseling, and employment counseling. Very innocent things. And most importantly – with EU money, not Polish. But even that was not done, so as not to spoil Trzaskowski’s election results.

Will this situation motivate Ukrainians to return or move to other European countries?

In a sense, for Ukraine, the worse host countries treat Ukrainians, the higher the probability that they will return. The key factor for return is not even the economic situation in Ukraine. This is the sad truth. And here, Poles, it seems to me, have chosen the right course to encourage more Ukrainians to return.

However, I don’t see people massively wanting to move anywhere right now. Imagine you’re a Ukrainian man in Poland without family, working 14 hours a day. And all your colleagues at the factory are Ukrainians, and you rent a room with Ukrainians. Even if Poles treat you badly, you don’t see those Poles. But if your factory closes and you’re laid off, or if employment conditions for Ukrainians drastically worsen, that could force a move. The environment factor is important for the middle class. For everyone else, the labor market is key.

Ukrainians want to keep their Ukrainian passport

Does Poland have an understanding and a plan for what to do with Ukrainians?

Poland doesn’t understand and doesn’t want to understand. It has a very short-term interest: for Ukrainians to pay taxes, and contributions to the Pension Fund. It would be good if they stayed, because that’s good for Polish demographics, but this is not conceptualized, at least at the political level.

And here it’s logical that Ukrainian identity in Poland is quite strong, partly due to the hostile attitude of Poles. A significant challenge is children who enter the Polish education system, which is still, especially outside large cities, very Polonocentric. A child brings home the phrase “W Polsce się mówi po polsku” – “In Poland, they speak Polish” on the first day of school, when you’ve always spoken Ukrainian with them. They didn’t come up with it themselves; adults told them.

I like the initiative where parents can appeal to schools for children to learn Ukrainian as a second foreign language. Of course, one always wishes for more funding from the Ministry of Culture to open Saturday schools and centers for learning Ukrainian language and culture.

I also hope that Ukraine will adopt a law on multiple citizenship sooner rather than later, because for many middle-class representatives, its absence hinders applying for a Polish passport. People feel safer in a new country when they can directly influence the political agenda. They are also more useful for Ukraine than people in limbo, but with a Ukrainian passport.

I know people who still haven’t applied for Polish citizenship despite the opportunities, because they are concerned about how it looks from Ukraine’s side, which neither prohibits nor explicitly allows dual citizenship.

Why is it important for Ukrainians in Poland to keep their Ukrainian passport?

It’s like symbolic complicity. It’s voting in Ukrainian elections abroad, even if you’ve lived outside Ukraine for a long time. For you, the very act of going to the polling station at the consulate shows that you care, that you are still concerned.

The reform of voting abroad is also important. When elections are held in Ukraine, it’s important that more people from abroad can participate. This is also a demonstration of a symbolic connection and that “I care.” If I’m already planning to return, I at least want to have an influence on what kind of government will be there.

What will happen to refugees in Poland?

In June, EU interior ministers will decide what to do next with Ukrainians who are in the European Union under the temporary protection mechanism. EU countries have begun working on other options for legalizing their stay. Does Poland have a decision on what to do with Ukrainian refugees once the war ends?

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Maciej Duszczyk, who oversees migrant issues, says he is waiting for this ministerial meeting to find out the duration of continued protection. Poland will continue temporary protection, as will the EU. Currently, there are no signals of its termination.

In Poland, since 2022, refugees have had the opportunity to receive temporary residence cards: for those who work, study, and through family reunification. Very few Ukrainians have taken advantage of this opportunity. Firstly, refugees are often in a state that researchers call “eternal temporariness.” Due to the nature of events in Ukraine and their lives in Poland, it is very difficult for them to make long-term plans. And since temporary protection already ensures their legal stay, they are not in a hurry to change anything.

Secondly, you need to have a certain type of employment contract to apply for a card. Not every employer offers such. Thirdly, our fellow citizens also believe that as long as they are under temporary protection, they have free medical services. No insurance contribution needs to be paid. Everyone I spoke with replied: “Am I crazy? Why would I give more to the state?”

But now there’s been a shift, and more people are applying for a residence card (residence permit in Poland – ed.). People who have at least vaguely heard about the Polish presidential campaign, where they talked about taking away child benefits (800+ monthly payment for each child in the family – ed.) and kicking them out of the doctor’s queue, want an alternative.

By the end of last year, Poland also promised to introduce a special CUKR residence card for three years for Ukrainians after temporary protection, which would have fewer requirements regarding source of income and work. Applications were supposed to start in February-March of this year, but so far they haven’t.

Social surveys show that 56% of Poles want Ukrainians to return home after the war. Polish authorities echo their citizens. And businesses are lighting candles in churches, hoping that these people won’t leave and will bring their relatives too, and more of them.

Are there new narratives and trends noticeable that Russia is stirring up in Poland using Ukrainians?

It seems to me that what worries Poles most now is that Russia is recruiting Ukrainians via Telegram to carry out terrorist attacks on EU territory. This is no longer about disinformation, but about security. A potentially greater threat if someone can plant an explosive device or burn down a shopping mall. And even if Polish media try to present data about nationality or citizenship cautiously in such situations, you still can’t hide a secret for long.

At the same time, Russian disinformation in Poland is now about Ukraine never winning this war, that Ukraine should not be admitted to NATO, and that Ukraine will drag Poland into the war.