Stefanchuk Transforms the Civil Code into a “Supermarket of Legal Opportunities.” Will There Be a Shortage of Freedom of Speech?
Speaker of Parliament Ruslan Stefanchuk has registered draft laws proposing sweeping amendments to the Civil Code of Ukraine (Nos. 14056 and 14057). Nearly 190 Members of Parliament signed on to the initiative. While collecting signatures, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada persuaded his colleagues that this was a “de-Sovietization of the Code” — a step toward European standards. At various events, including in the Supreme Court, Stefanchuk described these changes to legislation as a “supermarket of legal opportunities.”
However, a scandal erupted soon after the registration of the legislative initiative. The media community pointed out that the proposed provisions might carry risks for freedom of speech and media activity. Chair of the Committee on Freedom of Speech Yaroslav Yurchyshyn (Holos) immediately withdrew his signature, explaining that he had made a mistake and signed the document without the conclusions of media lawyers. Stefanchuk promised to involve civil society and experts in the discussion and held a meeting with media lawyers to discuss the proposed legislative changes.
The Speaker insists that his goal was to modernize outdated norms, adapt them to the challenges of the digital age, and ensure more flexible and effective protection of civil rights. Co-authors emphasize that these changes are part of Ukraine’s obligations on its path toward the EU. Yet, as often happens, the key lies in the details. The civic initiative “Holka” analyzed the provisions that have sparked the sharpest criticism.
One of the first outlets to respond critically and promptly to the proposals in Draft Law No. 14057 was Bihus.Info. Journalists there argued that the draft increases legal liability for critical publications and could threaten the very existence of investigative journalism:
“The draft proposes to automatically consider information unreliable if it is not confirmed by a court verdict. It also allows punishment not only for false facts but even for subjective opinions. It even proposes to demand compensation for criticism if the subject dislikes the tone of the publication.”
The Institute of Mass Information (IMI) also believes the draft law carries censorship risks and imposes excessively strict requirements on the media.
The IMI noted that the draft law expands the possibility of “prior censorship,” meaning a ban on publication before its release, which violates Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a response to “violations of personal rights,” the draft suggests blocking access to materials — for instance, blocking an online media page.
This could lead to excessive pressure on media outlets to remove content, as well as to increased self-censorship and abuse of legal action by officials or corporations.
Another major concern, according to the IMI, is the expansion of the right to refutation and the right to reply in the media.
That means any mention of a person in the media would grant that person the right to respond if they believe the publication violated their “personal rights.” The person need not even be named directly — it is enough that “the information allows the identification of a specific individual or includes them among a group of concerned persons.” The right to reply is proposed regardless of the publisher’s fault or the accuracy of the information that allegedly infringed on personal rights.
In response to criticism, the main author of the draft law, Ruslan Stefanchuk, assured that “the draft law does not impose new obligations or additional liability on media compared to current legislation,” providing his own arguments. The Speaker also emphasized: “This draft law is not about the media. It’s about expanding the personal rights of every individual.”
Human rights lawyer Valentyna Telychenko commented:
Following a wave of criticism from the media community, the Speaker published a lengthy post assuring that threats to freedom of speech were “imaginary.” Positioning his response as “arguments, not emotions,” he sought to refute key expert concerns.
His central claim: “This draft law is not about the media; it’s about expanding the personal rights of every person.”
And although the proposed norms apply to all individuals, their practical impact will be felt most acutely by journalists, investigators, and civic activists — those who serve as instruments of public oversight over power.
Stefanchuk’s Argument No. 1:
Courts will not be able to prohibit the dissemination of information before publication… this provision has existed in the Civil Code for 23 years.
That is true — the provision has long existed. Yet its application has always been controversial. For example, Viktor Medvedchuk once sued journalist Vakhtang Kipiani under this very article, seeking to ban the printing and distribution of his book The Case of Vasyl Stus — and initially won in the first instance. The case drew wide public attention, and the appellate court later sided with Kipiani and lifted the bans.
However, the current version of the article applies only to newspapers, books, films, TV, and radio programs — understandable, given the year the Code was adopted.
The new draft explicitly includes modern channels of information distribution: websites, social media pages, and messenger channels.
This means courts could now block access to online content someone dislikes. How judicial power would act in less publicized cases remains unknown.
Argument No. 2:
Refutation is not liability but a protection mechanism… no new obligations for the media are introduced.
Indeed, the proposed changes to Article 277 of the Civil Code largely mirror existing court practice, particularly the 2009 Supreme Court Plenum resolution.
The draft also refers to Article 43 of the Law on Media, which outlines cases when media actors may refuse to publish a refutation or reply. Yet it is unclear why duplication of these existing norms is necessary.
At the same time, certain issues remain unresolved — for instance, when journalists are forced by a court to retract information, but the ruling is later overturned on appeal, their right to restore the original publication remains unaddressed.
Argument No. 3:
The draft law does not restrict investigative journalism… it only states that a person should not be called guilty.
This is a substitution of concepts. The presumption of innocence is a principle of criminal law protecting individuals from state punishment without proof of guilt. The purpose of investigative journalism, however, is not to “declare someone guilty,” but to inform the public about matters of social concern.
The draft adds wording that may become a dangerous tool of pressure on the press — declaring information “false” if it “violates the presumption of innocence.”
This is legally absurd, since information can be true yet still relate to a criminal proceeding before a verdict is issued.
While some courts have previously recognized information as false on this basis, such practice is inconsistent. Introducing it into law may give public officials additional grounds for lawsuits and create a “presumption of guilt” for journalists forced to defend their publications in court.
For example, a journalist exposing that a suspect official’s wealth may have illicit origins could be forced to retract the story simply because no court verdict has been issued yet.
Thus, the old mechanism of refutation, combined with these new definitions, may become a tool of intimidation.
Argument No. 4:
The right to reply does not endanger journalists.
The right to reply is, in itself, a civilized mechanism. The danger arises when it operates alongside other norms. When an editorial office faces lawsuits for “violating the presumption of innocence” or “insulting through value judgments,” being obliged to publish lengthy “responses” from the subjects becomes another layer of legal and financial pressure on independent media.
Argument No. 5:
The right to be forgotten stems from EU integration and ensures a balance with the public interest.
Indeed, the “right to be forgotten” originates from European legislation (GDPR). However, in the EU, its implementation has been refined through years of jurisprudence clearly distinguishing between private individuals and public figures whose past actions are of public interest.
In the Ukrainian draft, the “balance” is ensured by exceptions preventing this right’s use when:
— personal data are necessary for exercising freedom of thought, expression, and opinion;
— they concern public officials or persons performing public functions.
In practice, however, these safeguards may prove merely declarative, as they are formulated broadly and open to manipulation. It remains unclear, for instance, whether a former official could invoke this right after leaving office. Given the inconsistencies of Ukraine’s judiciary, the rule could easily become a tool for politicians to “erase” records of corruption, scandals, or unpopular decisions.
Argument No. 6:
Compensation for value judgments… introduces no new obligations.
Formally, such a norm already exists in the 2009 Supreme Court Plenum resolution but is phrased vaguely. Yet European Court of Human Rights practice underscores that freedom of expression includes the right to choose the tone and form of speech — even harsh, shocking, or provocative — provided it serves the public interest.
Therefore, all published information must be evaluated contextually, considering intent, public interest, and the subject’s status.
The concerns of journalists and activists that this could increase the number of lawsuits — and produce a chilling effect — are therefore well-founded. Media outlets may resort to self-censorship, avoiding even justified criticism of powerful figures.
The Civil Code affects every citizen. The proposed amendments go far beyond freedom of speech — touching on issues like euthanasia, abortion, and even personal heraldry. Thus, they demand deeper study and discussion.
Stefanchuk’s previous initiative to abolish the Commercial Code (Draft No. 6013) has already paved the way for privatization specialists to appropriate state assets through non-privatization mechanisms.
Therefore, while modernization of legislation is important, any attempt to hide mechanisms for pressuring media and restricting freedom of speech under this pretext is unacceptable and must be eliminated.
Especially since the current parliament has already received a “yellow card,” after a previous hasty move to limit the work of anti-corruption bodies.
Without transparent and professional discussion, the “supermarket of legal opportunities” risks turning into a weapon against inconvenient truths.
It is encouraging, however, that such discussion has begun: a working group meeting was held with the Speaker of Parliament, media lawyers, MPs, and freedom of speech experts. The parties agreed to address all comments and proposals through amendments co-sponsored by the Speaker himself.
Another meeting will be held before the second reading to finalize the details.
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