



A RECORD 7 YEARS OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA

The anatomy of voting, transformation of the mono-majority, and parliamentary challenges during the war.

Analytical research by
the civic initiative "Holka".

A Record Seven Years: How the Verkhovna Rada Changed During the War Without Elections



The parliament is entering its eighth year of operation. People's deputies have resigned their mandates, moved to the government, fled Ukraine, lost their citizenship, died during the war, become subjects of criminal proceedings for high treason or corruption, and some have voluntarily stepped up to defend Ukraine by joining the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).

The war has brought to the surface one of the biggest flaws of the mixed electoral system—the majoritarian component. Since the 2019 elections were held under the old rules—before the new Electoral Code came into force—part of the parliament was elected personally in local constituencies. Now, when holding by-elections is impossible due to martial law, 47 constituencies remain vacant, and a number of regions have lost their representation in the parliament.

Moreover, due to the temporary occupation of parts of the regions by the enemy, the number of inactive constituencies has increased. As a result, the Rada sometimes lacks votes even for critically important European integration decisions. Andriy Motovylovets, deputy head of the “Servant of the People” faction, explained this by the fear, fatigue, and confusion of parliamentarians regarding the actions of anti-corruption bodies.

Following the 2019 parliamentary elections, “Servant of the People” prided itself on having a single-party majority. However, since 2023, it has existed only on paper: the faction has practically lost its ability to independently secure the 226 votes needed to pass laws. Currently, its ranks formally consist of exactly the bare minimum of 226 deputies. Yet this figure is precarious and is maintained, among other things, thanks to those who fled abroad and individuals involved in criminal proceedings.

For the seventh anniversary of the Verkhovna Rada’s work, the public initiative “Holka” analyzed all parliamentary votes and investigated how the discipline of factions has changed over these years. In particular, how the behavior of deputies shifted during politically sensitive votes, such as the abolition of the independence of NABU and SAPO, and the formation of a new government without Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov.




Government appointments, escapes, and death



Over the past seven years, 71 people’s deputies have lost their powers. Most often, politicians resigned their mandates of their own free will. Among them was the odious Illia Kyva, who fled to Russia after the start of the great war, from where he sent a statement renouncing his parliamentary seat. Later, he was liquidated in Russia. At the same time, the ban on pro-Russian parties did not mean the automatic loss of mandates for their representatives. Consequently, former members of the OPZZh (Opposition Platform — For Life) and other banned forces still remain in the parliament.

A portion of pro-Russian parliamentarians was removed from the Verkhovna Rada only after they lost their Ukrainian citizenship. One of them was Viktor Medvedchuk. The special services managed to detain Putin’s crony and exchange him for Ukrainian prisoners of war. But Ukrainian politicians also became victims of hostile special services. The most resonant was the assassination in Lviv of Andriy Parubiy—one of the key leaders of the Revolution of Dignity, who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine.

REASONS FOR PARLIAMENTARY PERSONNEL LOSSES



The category "of their own free will" includes those who wrote a personal resignation letter or, like Vakarchuk, did not join the faction of the party they ran from. Regarding factions and groups, the data at the time of losing the mandate was taken into account.

Data current as of 03.07.2026.

FACTIONS AND GROUPS:

	31
	5
«ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ»	5
	4
 Європейська Солідарність	4
	3
	3
other	16



Former people's deputy from ES (European Solidarity) Mykhailo Zabrodskyi resigned his mandate to fully dedicate himself to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

As for the "Servant of the People" faction, many deputies resigned here due to appointments to government positions. Most often, representatives of the single-party majority moved to the Cabinet of Ministers. Over the years of the full-scale war, Volodymyr Zelenskyy never agreed to create a coalition government and continues to replenish the Cabinet, usually with party list members from the ruling faction.

Thus, in July, during another government reboot, Vitaliy Bezghin and Denys Maslov left the Verkhovna Rada. Ministers change quite often. Looking at the changes in governments, only Mykhailo Fedorov, who entered the parliament on the "Servant of the People" list, worked continuously in the Cabinet from 2019 until his resignation in July 2026.

The number of people's deputies is currently the lowest in the history of Ukraine—390 out of 450. Therefore, positions generally go to list members so that the parliament's composition is replenished, because this allows the next politician on the party list to enter the parliament. Consequently, mandates are given to those who would not have entered the Verkhovna Rada under other historical circumstances.



**A record understaffed Rada.
How could this have been avoided?**



When Petro Poroshenko was the President of Ukraine, and a coalition majority worked in the Verkhovna Rada after the Revolution of Dignity, the public sector demanded an electoral reform to elect the parliament by open lists. Then there would be no majoritarian constituencies. And those politicians who had the greatest public support would enter the parliament from the party list, rather than those who bought the top spots on the list.



Still from a TSN broadcast. Rally in support of electoral reform, 2018

But in Ukraine, every ruling party tries to tailor the electoral rules to suit itself. Therefore, even the risk that the Verkhovna Rada could remain understaffed during the war did not force politicians to abandon their own political interests.

When Volodymyr Zelenskyy became president, he did not wait for the next parliamentary elections and dissolved the Verkhovna Rada. Thus, the old rules of the game with the majoritarian system remained in place. And “European Solidarity” certainly did not benefit from this, as it managed to secure only two mandates in the Lviv region. They went to Mykola Kniazhytskyi and Mykhailo Bondar.

Due to the annexation of Crimea and the temporary occupation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the 2019 elections were held not in 225 majoritarian constituencies, but only in 199. If the parliament had been elected by open lists before the full-scale invasion, there would not be such a serious challenge with the understaffing of the Verkhovna Rada. Currently, there are 178 majoritarian deputies in the Rada, and the majoritarian component has become a very palpable problem.

THE PRICE OF THE MAJORITARIAN SYSTEM

47

vacant districts


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fugitives



For context, during the full-scale war, another 27 constituencies became fully or partially occupied, or are now frontline territories—Mariupol, Bakhmut, Sievierodonetsk, Berdiansk, Nova Kakhovka. That is, the deputies of these constituencies formally represent communities that physically do not exist or are living under occupation.

According to the results of a sociological survey published by the International Republican Institute, Ukrainians' opinions on the need to reboot the parliament were divided almost equally: 49% strongly support or somewhat support it, while 47% somewhat do not support or strongly do not support it.



The survey was conducted by the sociological group "Rating" on behalf of the International Republican Institute in various months of 2024-2026

Besides vacant constituencies, there are constituencies where politicians have simply fled the country but remain with a mandate. The most audacious was the escape of majoritarian Artem Dmytruk from the Odesa region. The pro-Russian politician, who blocked the ban on the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate, having fled the country, even joined the meetings of the law enforcement (!) committee and voted. Only after a scandal was he excluded from this committee, but he kept his mandate.

It is important to note that among the fugitives is also a people's deputy from "Servant of the People"—majoritarian Oleksandr Kunitskyi from the Kharkiv region. Despite obvious reputational risks, he is not excluded, because purely formally, the single-party majority must maintain the appearance of existing. Currently, the ruling faction numbers a critical minimum of 226 deputies—and this is considering that in 2019 it started with 254 members.

After the 2019 elections, President Zelenskyy signed the Electoral Code, and local elections were even held under it. However, the post-war elections will likely be held under new rules. To this end, at the beginning of this year, the parliament involved the public sector.

Most likely, when the post-war elections take place, they will use proportional closed party lists. But new challenges have also emerged: discussions about banning or regulating Telegram, organizing elections abroad for a significant number of voters, etc.




From turbo mode to fatigue

It is not as important how many people's deputies a faction starts a convocation with, as it is how many will remain in it before the next elections. The era of the "mad printer," when the parliament quickly and harmoniously passed laws, ended in the Verkhovna Rada as soon as the pandemic began. And this is clearly seen if we plot the median and exclude anomalously high or low values

This in no way indicates the collapse of the single-party majority specifically at this stage. It's just that during this period, voting for opposition amendments became typical, which the "servants" massively ignored (pressing nothing or voting "against"). Half of all votes in 2021 garnered fewer than a dozen "for" votes from the "Servants of the People". It was these years that gave rise to the myth of a "single-party majority that supports nothing": the faction's average indicators drowned in amendment spam.

THREE ERAS OF THE MONO-MAJORITY: how the behavior of "Servant of the People" changed




In 2021, it was still possible to have a "renaissance" of the single-party majority and gather it for specific issues. To mobilize votes, there was a special "Razumkov cipher"—at that time, Dmytro Razumkov was the speaker. From the rostrum, he would say: "Please make a decision and vote" and "Please support and vote". In the first case, it was a signal to press the yellow or red button, and in the second—the green one.

But before the full-scale invasion, the "Servants of the People" experienced their first serious political upheaval—Razumkov, who was one of the key figures and headed the party list in the elections, was removed from the post of Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The politician immediately formed his own group and recruited people from the "Servant of the People" faction into it.

After the full-scale invasion, only in 2022 was there a moment of peak consolidation of votes in the parliament. The then-head of the "Servant of the People" party, Olena Shuliak, reported that politicians from the "Razumkov group" began returning to the faction, adding, "but the chill in relations still remains."

Since the beginning of 2023, the single-party majority has never given more than 226 votes for any legislative initiative that later became a law. The calculation took into account laws adopted in the first reading (as a basis and as a whole) and in the second reading.

NUMBER OF SIGNED LAWS WHERE THE "SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE" FACTION GAVE 226+ VOTES



The graphic was created based on the analysis of open data from the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Laws with the status "law signed", which were voted as a basis and in general, as well as in the second reading, were taken into account.



It is also worth noting here that the "Servants of the People" faction itself has lost many representatives. Some became unaffiliated because they received a position that obliged them to leave the faction (Dmytro Razumkov, Oleksandr Korniienko), and some were simply expelled, like Oleksandr Dubinskyi. Others fled to parliamentary groups—"For the Future" or "Restoration of Ukraine".




Agency in parliament. Who is not silent during important votes?



Deputies have almost stopped voting with the red button since 2022. Even the opposition. This is clearly visible in this graph, where the red line represents people's deputies voting "against". This line is almost reduced to zero.

How has the voting dynamics in the Verkhovna Rada changed?



The visualization of roll-call votes is based on data from the Verkhovna Rada website.
Each dot represents one vote.



During the consideration of abolishing the independence of NABU and SAPO, only a few representatives of “European Solidarity” voted with the red button, but importantly, there were votes against among the “servants” as well. Hanna Bondar, Dmytro Hurin, and Roman Hryshchuk voted with the red button. These are majoritarian deputies from the ruling faction.

Those elected under the majoritarian system may have more agency, because the party can get rid of list members, but holding elections during a war in majoritarian constituencies, as already noted, is impossible, and under such conditions, every people’s deputy carries significant weight for the parliament. But the resistance of the majoritarians is not massive, and therefore this is another argument why ultimately the country should move to an open party list system and never again jeopardize the constitutional composition of the Rada at 450 mandates.

When talking about the vote on abolishing the independence of anti-corruption bodies, one cannot forget the names of those politicians who blocked the rostrum and physically could not press the “against” button.




People's deputies who blocked the rostrum during the vote to abolish the independence of anti-corruption bodies

It is important to note that personnel appointments remain perhaps the only votes where the opposition ES and “Voice” continue to vote against. Conversely, the “servants” vote for appointments almost unanimously—83.3% “for”.

This is a record among all types of votes, and it is here that the split between factions is maximal. While the servants support personnel issues, ES, on the contrary, is in fierce opposition, giving only 28.3% “for” and 13.4% “against”—the highest share of open “against” voting by any faction on any type of vote throughout the entire convocation. Notably, those from the banned OPZZh party, who formed parliamentary groups, are more willing to vote for appointments than the democratic opposition.

The most scandalous was the very last government change, when Defense Minister Fedorov was removed. However, the voting figures this time were not anomalous.

Personnel issues. How did factions and groups vote?



Although it's worth mentioning here that during this appointment, a new form of protest emerged—a statement of mandate resignation as a political step. People's deputy Mykyta Poturaiev, a member of the party's political council, who was called the political strategist of the “Servants of the People”, wrote a statement resigning his powers. Understanding the political reason for such actions, Poturaiev's colleagues from “Servant of the People”, “European Solidarity”, and “Voice” emphasized that they would vote “against” and would not allow Poturaiev to resign his mandate.

By the way, representatives of the “Servant of the People” since 2022 have generally voted “against” less often, but increasingly do not participate in voting—this could be either a silent protest or sabotage, which allows minimizing conflicts within the faction. For context, the number of non-votes compared to the pre-war period increased from 5.9% to 19.9%. And this applies not only to the “Servants of the People”.

Thus, during the consideration of the scandalous draft Civil Code by Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk in the first reading, 45 people's deputies simply did not vote, likely so as not to spoil relations with the speaker. At least Maksym Pavliuk, Yuliia Yatsyk, Yuliia Ovchynnykova, Artur Herasymov, and Serhii Velmozhnyi voted "for" or abstained on issues before and after, but for the key issue—the consideration of the draft Civil Code in the first reading—they simply did not vote. Only two parliamentarians from "Voice" voted against: Nataliia Pipa and Inna Sovsun. Another 86 politicians were absent entirely.

But there is a silent protest manifested in not voting, and there is also outright sabotage among the "Servants of the People". Politicians who have, for example, pro-Russian views resort to such sabotage. They either pretend to be absent or vote against when issues critical to national security are being considered, such as the ban on the Russian Orthodox Church or decolonization. Thus, Roman Kaptielov, a "servant" elected in the Dnipropetrovsk region, voted against the final step of decolonization—a resolution to rename 333 settlements. This people's deputy in the ruling faction votes "against" the most—73.7%. "Servants" who try to block issues important for national security can simply pull their cards from the slots and pretend to be absent.

However, the absence of some deputies at the Verkhovna Rada sessions is understandable. There are politicians who stepped up to defend the country: Roman Kostenko and Roman Lozynskyi from "Voice", Sviatoslav Yurash ("Servant of the People"), Serhii Rudyk (group "For the Future"). Another sitting people's deputy from ES, Yana Zinkevych, is the permanent commander and founder of the volunteer medical battalion "Hospitallers".

The legislative branch in its seventh year of work can no longer rely on the arithmetic of a single faction. A mature solution is the institutionalization of what is already happening out of necessity every day—a broad coalition with opposition forces, with transparent rules for developing and passing laws instead of the ad-hoc "gathering of votes" for a specific decision.

€50 billion from the EU for reforms. Who is sabotaging them in parliament, and which pro-Russian politicians are trying to whitewash their reputation?

The European Union provides financial support to Ukraine for implementing reforms. In order for the state budget to receive it, the Verkhovna Rada must vote for the relevant laws included in the special list of the Ukraine Facility program. This is an opportunity to receive 50 billion euros from 2024 to 2027. Each reform literally has its price. A failed vote in the session hall can mean a delay in securing budget financing.

In addition, the EU recently approved changes to the Ukraine Facility support mechanism. The changes foresee the inclusion of an additional 8.3 billion euros in funding this year. These funds will be provided through the Ukraine Support Loan mechanism — an EU support tool for Ukraine totaling up to 90 billion euros for this and the coming year. Specifically, Ukraine must fulfill additional obligations in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption.

The biggest saboteur of the Ukraine Facility plan's implementation is "Batkivshchyna". Yulia Tymoshenko's team may not only ignore the voting but also vote against it. Notably, environmental issues included in the Ukraine Facility program did not receive a single vote from them.

Since 2023, the ruling faction has not once provided the 226 votes needed for draft laws to take effect. NGO "Holka" wrote about this in the first part of the study prepared for the parliament's seven years of work. But the paradox is that the faction leader, Davyd Arakhamia, managed to build a hybrid model — a situational coalition that delivers the desired result at the right moment. As the media reported, Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally "prayed away" [saved] Arakhamia from suspicion in the high-profile "Midas" case. One of the reasons is that he is indispensable in the Verkhovna Rada.


Data confirms that the opposition most frequently helps fulfill European integration obligations; former representatives of the pro-Russian OPZZh provide votes for personnel changes; “Dovira” maximally props up economic issues; and when there is a shortage of votes, barter voting can be negotiated with the “Za Maibutnie” parliamentary group.



Money for Reforms: Who is Sabotaging the Ukraine Facility, and Who is Pushing Through Dangerous Norms?




For introducing reforms, Ukraine can receive funds from international partners that help support the country's economy during the war and are distributed across three directions: state budget support (slightly over €38 billion), the formation of an investment fund (slightly under €10 billion), and government assistance for synchronizing national legislation with EU legislation (slightly under €5 billion).



Progress of the implementation of the Ukraine Plan.
Data from the Ministry of Economy from the Ukraine Facility Plan website.

Ukraine's success in meeting these indicators is tracked on a special platform — the Ukraine Facility Plan, which contains a list of reforms. Basic reforms cover anti-corruption, judicial reform, public administration, and public finance management, alongside economic and sectoral development reforms (energy sector, transport and logistics, etc.).

The ruling party has not given the minimally required 226 votes for any law signed by the President since 2023. When it comes to laws from the Ukraine Facility, “Servant of the People” provides approximately 80% of votes based on the number of faction members. Most often, the “Dovira” parliamentary group saves the situation — giving almost 75% of the votes based on its member count.




An analysis of voting on laws aimed at fulfilling this plan proves that it is “Batkivshchyna” that sabotages the voting. While for all other issues the faction gives 35% of votes “for”, for the 41 laws corresponding to this plan, it gave less than 17%. Moreover, it is the only political force that openly opposes European integration reforms, casting 7.4% of the faction's votes “against” draft laws from the Ukraine Facility instrument list.

“Batkivshchyna” MPs cast the highest number of “against” votes regarding the anti-corruption law on the detection, tracing, and management of assets derived from corruption and other crimes, as well as the draft law on mineral regulation. In both cases — 14 votes each.

The “Batkivshchyna” members did not cast a single vote for laws needed to implement the Ukraine Facility Plan when they concerned environmental protection. And there might be an explanation for this. At the local level, party representatives have figured in a series of scandals involving illegal land allocation.



HOW DID ❤️ BATKIVSHCHYNA VOTE ON UKRAINE FACILITY BILLS?



WWF-Ukraine representative Yaroslav Teleshun notes that a significant part of Ukraine's obligations to the EU is related to environmental protection and, simultaneously, to minimizing corruption risks:



Yaroslav Teleshun

Representative of
WWF-Ukraine

It should be separately emphasized that environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) procedures are, above all, not only about preserving the environment and people's health but also a safeguard against the emergence of corruption risks. Weakening these instruments would contradict not only Ukraine's course toward EU membership and its international obligations but also the principles of sustainable, transparent, and accountable recovery embedded in the Ukraine Facility mechanism.

In the context of anti-corruption safeguards and environmental protection, one cannot help but mention the fact that Yulia Tymoshenko's faction hardly provided any votes when, following last year's citizen protests and warnings from international partners, the parliament was forced to restore the independence of anti-corruption agencies NABU and SAPO. The party leader stated from the rostrum:



Yulia Tymoshenko

Leader of the
"Batkivshchyna" party

People came out, not knowing what NABU and SAPO are; they came out to fight against the fight against corruption. They came out so that corruption in the country would stop. They came out against the lawlessness they are sick of. And they do not know the nuances of the draft laws that were voted on.

During these debates in parliament, Tymoshenko's position was booed by representatives of "European Solidarity," prompting "Batkivshchyna" member Serhiy Vlasenko to show an indecent gesture to Petro Poroshenko.



Vlasenko shows the “middle finger” gesture to Petro Poroshenko, who booed Tymoshenko's speech regarding NABU and SAPO.

As for “European Solidarity”, their faction's support during the consideration of the Ukraine Facility Plan depends on the subject of the draft law. On average, ES provides 37.6% of the votes. Business-related draft laws receive the least support, while environmental protection projects enjoy the most. In those cases, support can increase to 75%.

Member of Parliament from “European Solidarity” Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, who heads the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU, notes that to strengthen partners’ trust, Ukraine still needs to meet a series of requirements:




Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze

Member of Parliament
("European Solidarity")

Specifically, they concern the transparency and independence of the prosecutor's office's activities, the reform of the State Bureau of Investigations, and the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030. The government introduced the Anti-Corruption Strategy only under pressure from parliamentarians, and it still hasn't been voted on, although the state should have been implementing it since the beginning of this year.

It is important to note that regarding the Anti-Corruption Strategy, questions arise not only for the Government and the Verkhovna Rada but also for the NACP, as they are the ones who missed the deadlines for drafting the document. The Law “On Corruption Prevention” obliged the Agency to develop the strategy by August 1 of last year, but the document only reached the Cabinet of Ministers at the beginning of this year (Article 18).



The loss of 2.3 billion euros due to non-fulfillment of the Ukraine Facility Plan indicators. Graphic from the presentation on the Resilience, Reconstruction and Relief for Ukraine consortium website.

It is worth recalling here that when the National Agency on Corruption Prevention was working on the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy, “Holka” uncovered a number of corruption risks in the “Construction” section, which was prepared, in part, by the assistants of the former head of the “Servant of the People” party, Olena Shuliak. These risks in the draft strategy have currently been minimized.



Member of Parliament Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze reminds us that similar risks existed when Shuliak lobbied for the urban planning "reform" 5655:



Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze

Member of Parliament
("European Solidarity")

Back then, despite public outcry, the Verkhovna Rada adopted this shameful document, and only after criticism from the European Parliament was Zelenskyy forced to backpedal and not sign it. But even after that, they tried to push the scheme through Government decisions. Now they are laying landmines in the Civil Code, which is being prepared for the second reading and opposed by a number of civic organizations. Overall, there are countless such glaring cases. It is especially infuriating when blatant corruption and violations of European integration obligations are branded and promoted as European integration initiatives. This undermines trust in the process.

And while with the urban planning “reform,” both the civic sector and international partners were able to identify and stop the risks in time, this is not always the case. Under the guise of fulfilling the requirements of the Ukraine Facility Plan, norms that actually worsen the situation of citizens or create new loopholes for the authorities can be embedded in a draft law.

For example, during the analysis of the draft law “On the Basic Principles of Housing Policy,” expert Heorhiy Mohylnyi discovered that the document’s provisions foresee the cancellation of the joint obligation of the state and local self-government bodies to provide free housing, with subsequent privatization, to those waiting in the apartment queue. At the same time, the Ukraine Facility Plan did not envision such changes. Even according to conservative estimates by Minregion, this involves writing off over 900 billion UAH in state and local government obligations to citizens.

At the same time, in the accompanying documentation, Minregion and the head of the Committee on the Organization of State Power and Local Self-Government, Olena Shuliak, claimed that the adoption of this draft by the end of 2025 is necessary specifically to fulfill obligations under the Ukraine Facility plan.

The same happened with the abolition of the Commercial Code, which was lobbied for by Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk (Draft No. 6013). The adopted law essentially opens opportunities for the largest redistribution of state property through non-privatization methods since Ukraine’s independence. Meanwhile, the Verkhovna Rada failed to provide proper protection against the privatization of strategic enterprises, as required by the Constitution.

In addition to the Ukraine Facility Plan, there is another important list for the international community — the so-called Kachka-Kos plan. The document is named as such because former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka and European Commissioner Marta Kos worked on the agreements between Ukraine and the EU. This is a document of ten points that must be fulfilled throughout this year, but as of July, Ukraine had only managed to implement this plan by 15%.

ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЯ

Олена Шуляк: Житлова реформа потрібна Україні вже багато років, а вимога Ukraine Facility може стати пусковим механізмом для неї

10 СІЧНЯ 2025



Olena Shuliak's statement on the necessity of adopting the housing reform as part of the Ukraine Facility Plan. Screenshot from the "Servant of the People" party website.



A Lifeline for the "Mono-majority": Who Provides the Decisive Votes and When Does European Solidarity Do It?



"Servant of the People" remains the backbone of the parliament. On average, the faction provides 207 votes "for," which is not enough to pass a law. Notably, after Dmytro Razumkov formed his inter-factional association "Smart Politics," it has negatively impacted the voting situation within the "Servant of the People" faction since 2022 because Razumkov's group started attending meetings less frequently.


Therefore, the authorities have to gather votes from other factions and parliamentary groups. And here, everything depends on what exactly the Verkhovna Rada is voting on.

To understand who really helps a draft law become a law, “Holka” counted not just the number of “for” votes from each faction or group, but introduced two concepts — auxiliary and decisive votes. If any faction or group, along with other factions or groups, helped “Servant of the People” cross the 226-vote threshold, such votes are recorded as auxiliary.

That is, a single law can have several such auxiliary groups if, without the votes of each of them individually, 226 cannot be reached. This indicator demonstrates how many times a faction or group was a necessary part of the majority, but it does not mean it alone “pushed through” the law.



Supporting Votes



Data on how factions and parliamentary groups voted on the bills is based on open data from the Verkhovna Rada website. Supporting votes show when a faction/group added votes, but other factions/groups could have done the same at the same time. Without the decisive votes of a faction/group, the Verkhovna Rada would not have adopted the decision.


The “Dovira” group most often helps the mono-majority with auxiliary votes. It has 77 auxiliary votes to its credit. Interestingly, if you add together the fragments of the banned OPZZh party — namely the parliamentary groups “Restoration of Ukraine” and “Platform for Life and Peace” — there were more auxiliary votes here than from “Dovira” (105). And during the war, the tandem of “Servant of the People” and the remnants of OPZZh, as the data show, has only strengthened.

But the votes of a certain political force may not be auxiliary, but decisive. This happens when, if you remove the votes of one faction or group, the result falls below 226. That is, the draft law would never have become a law without these specific votes.

For example, the law “On the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine” received a total of 242 votes, and here “Dovira” provided 17 votes. If you subtract this number from the total, the difference is 225 — one vote short of what is required for passage. “Dovira” is the absolute leader in the number of decisive votes: it accounts for 15 laws passed in this manner.




Decisive Votes



It should be noted that both “Dovira” and the fragments of OPZZh help when it comes to personnel issues. And special attention should be paid to the fact that there are MPs elected from the pro-Russian OPZZh party who, after the full-scale invasion, are trying to whitewash their reputations and vigorously vote in unison with the “Servants of the People.” The top 5 include Serhiy Larin, Oleksandr Kachnyi, Serhiy Liovochkin, Ihor Kisiiov, and Oleksandr Puzanov.



WHITEWASHING EFFECT: TOP 5. WHO FROM EX-OPZZH VOTES WITH THE GOVERNMENT




And there is a third metric that determines the strength of votes in an authority body (the Banzhaf index). This methodology was proposed by John Banzhaf III, who applied this mathematical approach in the 1960s to analyze voting in a U.S. community.

While decisive votes show how many times a faction or group actually saved a specific law, the Banzhaf index works differently: it shows how structurally important a faction is for decision-making overall, regardless of how often it actually does so.

That is, a small faction or parliamentary group can have a significant impact if, without it, the required number of votes is simply not reached. Conversely, the votes of a large faction do not always give it proportional influence: if the threshold can be crossed without it, its additional votes become insignificant.



VOTING POWER



Calculated across voting topics, the Banzhaf index shows not just who gave how many votes, but who is the most influential player in a specific field. While “Dovira” leads in the total number of decisive votes (excluding the “Servants of the People”), according to the Banzhaf index, “European Solidarity” unexpectedly takes second place. This faction becomes structurally important exactly when it comes to European integration issues, ratification of international agreements, security, or social laws — meaning it has a clear thematic specialization of influence.

But the most interesting part is that it was the Banzhaf index that allowed “Holka” to uncover possible barter voting by the “Za Maibutnie” parliamentary group. Politicians from this group are linked to Kolomoiskyi’s group. The group’s representatives rarely provide a significant number of votes. Instead, their support spikes sharply in situations showing signs of a situational exchange of votes: the group may back a decision needed by the authorities if, in return, it receives support for an issue important to it.

A telling example is the vote for “Budget-2026”. Opposition factions “European Solidarity” and “Holos” did not support the draft budget. Therefore, “Za Maibutnie” essentially held a golden share — the ruling party heavily relied on their votes. But the government’s draft budget contained a mechanism designed to minimize the financial consequences of “Ihor Mazepa’s law”. According to this law, if 10 years have passed, neither the community nor the state can reclaim green zones, coastlines, or cultural heritage sites. And if 10 years have not yet passed, a deposit equivalent to the market value of the object must be paid into the court’s account from the budget. In order for the funds for such deposits to appear in the budget, they had to be envisioned in the state budget. Given that there are no funds during wartime, the government drafted the 2026 budget to try to delay the implementation of this harmful law.

And this is where a revealing convergence of interests arises. To block the government's attempt to protect both budget funds and state property, amendments appeared in the draft budget that had identical authors: the head of the "Servant of the People" faction Davyd Arakhamia, Ihor Fris, and the co-chair of the "Za Maibutnie" parliamentary group Taras Batenko.

It was Fris who was one of the key authors of "Ihor Mazepa's law", and Batenko and Fris have previously been linked by the media to Kolomoiskyi's informal group, which benefits from such legalization of property stolen from the state.

So, in this case, it is not just a coincidence of votes. There is a shared interest, joint authorship of amendments, and the group's votes depend on the passage of the decision it needs.

Analysis of MPs' voting shows that the Ukrainian parliament is effectively operating in a situational majority mode. The head of the "Servant of the People" faction, Davyd Arakhamia, builds partnerships differently every time: "Dovira" for economic issues or, like the remnants of OPZZh, for personnel decisions; "European Solidarity" for a portion of reforms and European integration laws. And when votes are desperately tight, a barter can be arranged with "Za Maibutnie."

The head of the "Dovira" parliamentary group, Oleh Kulinich, asserts that a genuine coalition is currently impossible, and therefore the Verkhovna Rada will continue working in the format of a situational coalition:



Oleh Kulinich

Head of the "Dovira" parliamentary group

What is encouraging is that the parliament's subjectivity increased right when Yulia Svyrydenko headed the government. Ministers started a dialogue with MPs. Now there is a new Prime Minister — Serhiy Koretskyi. But this culture of communication with parliamentarians, fortunately, is preserved.

Under such conditions, “Servant of the People” really has no need to form a broad coalition. Especially since ES and “Holos” are their political opponents, and, according to the Constitution, a coalition can only be built with factions, not parliamentary groups. Therefore, the fragments of the former OPZZh or the “Dovira” group cannot become an official part of the coalition unless individual deputies decide to join the ruling party faction, which carries reputational risks. A model resting on situational agreements is capable of passing decisions. But it does not leave behind anyone who would take responsibility for the country’s course if something goes wrong.

The study on the parliament’s work was created based on open data, which was systematized in a digital service as part of the “Recharging the Country is in Your Power” project, supported by the NED.

Anyone can gain access to the digital service containing the systematized data by sending an email requesting access to **ngo.holka@gmail.com**.

“Glavkom” acts as the information partner of the project.